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 In recent years, critical habitat has been subject to a great deal of 
controversy and numerous lawsuits.  Critical habitat is an integral part of 
the Endangered Species Act (ESA) that serves not only to protect the 
species and its’ habitat but may also help the recovery of the species.  
Critical habitat has been the subject of a large number of recent lawsuits.  
These lawsuits arise from conservation groups, forcing the Fish and Wildlife 
Service (FWS) to designate critical habitat and from developmental 
groups, claiming that the economic analyses used by the FWS during the 
designation of critical habitat are faulty.  The economic analyses that are 
currently being done by the FWS are quantifying the costs of critical 
habitat to the extent possible while virtually making no effort to quantify 
the benefits of critical habitat.  This potentially biased economic analysis 
can skew public opinion by presenting an unbalanced result from the 
analysis.  Therefore, this thesis presents a methodology for 
comprehensively identifying and quantifying, where possible, the costs 






In 1973, the Congress of the United States passed the Endangered 
Species Act (ESA).  It arose as a response to the growing concern over 
global losses in biodiversity.  It has been estimated that as many as 40-100 
species go extinct everyday worldwide.  The ESA was written to slow down 
and eventually stop this extinction rate.  It is “the broadest and most 
powerful law to provide protection for endangered species and their 
habitats” (NRC, 1995, 1).  It is jointly administered by the Fish and Wildlife 
Service (FWS) and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS).  The FWS 
has jurisdiction over terrestrial species while the NMFS has jurisdiction over 
aquatic species.  While this thesis recognizes the presence of the NMFS in 
the ESA, it will deal exclusively with the FWS.  This is due to the vast majority 
of species falling under the jurisdiction of the FWS and the contentious 
history the FWS has with the ESA. 
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Basics of the Endangered Species Act 
 
The ESA calls for species, and in some cases sub-species and local 
populations, which are in danger of extinction to be listed as either 
“endangered” or “threatened.”  The ESA defines “endangered,” the more 
serious of the two designations, to mean “any species which is in danger 
of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range,” excluding 
insects considered pests (16 U.S.C. §1532(6)).  Further, the ESA defines 
“threatened” to mean “any species which is likely to become an 
endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a 
significant portion of its range” (16 U.S.C. §1532(20)).  The list for 
endangered and threatened animals is found at 50 CFR 17.11 and the list 
for endangered and threatened plants is found at 50 CFR 17.12 (USFWS 
002).  Once a species becomes listed, it gains tremendous protection from 
the remainder of the ESA.   
The Listing Process 
The listing process is ideally a straightforward process (Fig. 1).  
Throughout the process, the Secretary must make the decision “solely on 
the basis of the best scientific and commercial data available” (16 U.S.C. 
§1533(b)(1)(A)).  First, a petition is filed to list a species.  Anyone, including 
private citizens and organizations, can file the petition to list (Snape, 1995).  









































Figure 1.  The Listing Process 
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service data
 
whether the petition has enough information to determine whether a 
formal review is necessary.  If a formal review is necessary, the Secretary 
has twelve months to decide whether listing is “warranted, not warranted, 
or warranted but that the ‘immediate proposal’ is ‘precluded’ by pending 
proposals of other species” (Houck, 1993).  This classification, “warranted 
but precluded” was granted to the FWS in order to give them the latitude 
to focus on species with greater need (Houck, 1993).  If the proposal is 
found “not warranted” the species is no longer considered for listing.  If 
the proposal is found “warranted but precluded,” the species is not listed 
at that time but is intended to be listed at the first possible moment.  As of 
1993, some species had been “warranted but precluded” for sixteen 
years (Houck, 1993).  If the proposal is found “warranted” the proposal is 
published in the Federal Register as a proposed rule, the Secretary notifies 
the affected state and local governments, places a summary of the 
proposal in a local paper, and holds a public hearing, if necessary 
(Snape, 1995).  The Secretary has a number of factors to help with the 
decision of whether to list the species or not.  If any of the following criteria 
are met, then listing usually occurs: 
• “the present or threatened destruction, modification, or curtailment 
of the species’ habitat or range; 
• over utilization for commercial, recreational, scientific, or 
educational purposes; 
• disease or predation; 
• the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms; or 





After publishing the proposed rule in the Federal Register and local 
papers, the Service accepts comments, usually in a 60 day period.  After 
12 months from the listing proposal, the Secretary has three options.  First, if 
the evidence supports it, a final rule is published.  If the final rule is 
approved, it takes effect after 30 days and the species becomes listed.  
Second, the proposal may be withdrawn because the biological 
information does not support the listing.  Third, the proposal can be 
extended for six months because there is serious disagreement about the 
biological information or “biological appropriateness of the listing” 
(USFWS, 2002).  After the six months, the Secretary must make a decision 
based upon “the best scientific information available” (USFWS, 2002).  
Once a species does become listed, its status is reviewed every five years.   
There is also an emergency listing process that can bypass the 
formal review process.  The Secretary must publish a notice of why the 
emergency listing is necessary and notify the state and federal 
conservation agencies affected by the listing.  These emergency listing 
expire after 240 days unless the Secretary decides that formal listing is 
necessary (Snape, 1995).   
Critical Habitat 
Concurrent with listing the species as “endangered” or 
“threatened,” the FWS is mandated to designate “critical habitat.”  If it is 
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not possible to designate critical habitat at the time of listing, FWS is 
granted a one year extension to designate.  At the end of the year, the 
FWS must make a designation based on the data that they currently have 
(Shingleton, 2003).  “Critical habitat” is defined by the ESA to be   
 
“(i) the specific areas within the geographical 
area occupied by the species, at the time it is 
listed in accordance with the provision of section 
4 of this Act, on which are found those physical 
or biological features (I) essential to the 
conservation of the species and (II) which may 
require special management consideration or 
protection; and   
(ii) specific areas outside the geographical area 
occupied by the species at the time it is listed in 
accordance with the provision of section 4 of this 
Act, upon a determination by the Secretary that 
such areas are essential for the conservation of 
the species” (16 U.S.C. §1532(5)(A)) 
 
Thus, critical habitat is not only the habitat that the species is 
currently occupying (i) but also the habitat that the species is not 
occupying but that is important for the “conservation” of the species (ii).  
“Conservation” means “the use of all methods and procedures which are 
necessary to bring any endangered species or threatened species to the 
point at which the measures provided pursuant to this Act are no longer 
necessary” (16 U.S.C. §1532(3)).  Thus, critical habitat is the habitat that 
the species is currently occupying but also that habitat that is unoccupied 
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but that is needed for the recuperation and delisting of the species 
(Snape, 1995).   
Critical habitat is supposed to be designated  
“on the basis of the best scientific data available 
and after taking into consideration the economic 
impact, and any other relevant impact, of 
specifying any particular area as critical habitat. 
The Secretary may exclude any area from critical 
habitat if he determines that the benefits of such 
exclusion outweigh the benefits of specifying 
such area as part of the critical habitat, unless he 
determines, based on the best scientific and 
commercial data available, that the failure to 
designate such area as critical habitat will result 
in the extinction of the species concerned” (16 
U.S.C §1533(b)(2)).   
 
In contrast to the listing of a species, critical habitat is designated after 
taking into consideration economic factors.  While the ESA does not 
explicitly state that a cost-benefit analysis will be done, the language of 
the statute “may exclude…if…the benefits of such exclusion outweigh the 
benefits of specifying such area” basically calls for one. Critical habitat is 
supposed to be designated when the species is listed.  However, this has 
rarely been the case (Houck, 1993).  The FWS has generally refused to 
designate critical habitat, claiming it was not “prudent” (Sinden, 
forthcoming).  For instance, as of June 2003, only 33% of listed species 
have had critical habitat designated (GAO, 2003).   This point will be 




Once the species is listed, there are two basic protections offered 
by the ESA.  First, when any federal agencies takes any action, which 
includes funding, permitting, etc of private actors, then they must consult 
with the FWS to ensure that they do not “jeopardize” the species or 
destroy or “adversely modify” its habitat.  The second is that it becomes 
illegal for any actor, whether public or private, to “take” the species.   
The first protection the Act offers is federal consultation.  Under Sec. 
7 of the ESA, all federal agencies must “consult” with the FWS to ensure 
that their actions do not “jeopardize the continued existence of any” 
listed species or “result in the destruction or adverse modification of” 
critical habitat (16 U.S.C. §1536).  While “jeopardy” is not defined in the 
Act, the FWS defines it to mean any activity that would “reduce 
appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and recovery of a listed 
species” (50 CFR 402.02).  Similarly, the FWS defines “destruction or 
adverse modification” to mean an “alteration that appreciably diminishes 
the value of critical habitat for both the survival and recovery of a listed 
species” (50 CFR 402.02).  It is important to note that both “jeopardy” and 
“adverse modification” are defined in terms of “both survival and 
recovery” (emphasis added).  Again, this will be discussed later.   
When a federal agency, known as an “action agency,” carries out, 
funds, or permits an action they must consult with the FWS to determine 
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whether they are going to “jeopardize” the species itself or “adversely 
modify” its critical habitat, if any has been designated.  This is part of the 
“informal” consultation process.  If the proposed action will not affect any 
endangered species, then the there is no need for any more consultations 
and the action may continue.  However, if an endangered species is 
affected, then the “formal consultation” begins.  This is a written request 
from the action agency to the FWS to begin section 7(a)(2) consultation 
(50 CFR 402.02).  The FWS, along with the action agency, then conduct an 
investigation to determine what effect the action will have on the 
endangered species and its’ critical habitat.  After the investigation, the 
FWS then issues a biological opinion, which is the formal statement of 
whether jeopardy or adverse modification will take place.  Generally, if 
the biological opinion determines that jeopardy or adverse modification is 
found, then that federal action is modified so that there is no, or at least 
less of, an impact.  The FWS and the action agency work together to 
provide “reasonable and prudent alternatives” so that there will be less of 
an impact from the proposed action (Snape, 1995).   
For the vast majority of cases, the action is allowed to continue, with 
modifications.   From 1987 and 1991 there were 73,560 consultations.  Only 
131 determined that there was potential jeopardy (Rachlinski, 1997).  In 
addition, only 18 Federal projects were not allowed to proceed 
(Rachlinski, 1997).  If no alternative is found, then the action agency can 
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appeal to a committee known informally as the “God Squad” (Sinden, 
forthcoming).    The “God Squad” was created by the 1978 Amendments 
and consists of “the Secretaries of the Interior, Agriculture, and Army, the 
Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, the Administrator of the 
EPA, the Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, and an individual nominated by the governor of the 
affected state and appointed by the President” (Peterson, 1999, 487).  This 
committee has the power to grant exemptions from the ESA.  If 5 of the 7 
members approve, then the species is exempted.  While the biological 
opinion is not binding on the action agency, the Courts have given 
deference to these opinions and the federal agencies risk citizen suits if 
they continue with an unmodified project. The Supreme Court sees the 
biological opinions as “virtually determinative” (Sinden, forthcoming).  If 
the biological opinion does find that there are impacts on the species, the 
Agency can issue an incidental take permit to the action agency.  This 
permit recognizes that the project will not impact the species as a whole 
but that a small number of individuals might be “taken,” or “harassed, 
harmed, injured, or killed” (Snape, 1995).    
The second protection the Act offers is the prohibition on “take.”  
Section 9 of the ESA prohibits the “take of any…species within the United 
States” (16 U.S.C. §1538). “Take” is defined by the Act to mean “to harass, 
harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to 
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attempt to engage in any such conduct (16 U.S.C. §1532(19)).  Further, 
the term “harm” has been defined by the FWS to mean any act that kills 
or injures the species.  This “act may include significant habitat 
modification or degradation” (50 CFR §17.3).  This use of the term “harm” 
to include modification of habitat has been upheld by the Courts.  This 
interpretation has been upheld by the Supreme Court in Babbit v. Sweet 
Home (115 S. Ct. 2407).  Thus, the species’ habitat is protected not only by 
critical habitat but also by “harm.”  However, “harm” only applies to 
habitat where the species actually is located; it does not include habitat 
that is unoccupied by the species but that is needed by the species for 
recovery.  This unoccupied habitat is only protected by critical habitat.   
From the protections offered by both “take” and “harm,” it 
becomes illegal to do anything that negatively affects an endangered 
species.  This prohibition applies to both federal and other public agencies 
but also to private citizens and corporations, in the case of animal 
species.  For endangered plant species, the protection does not extend 
to private citizens and corporations.  This is the reason why many 
landowners do not like the ESA (NESARC, 2003).  They feel that it restricts 
the use of their private property.   
However, it is still possible to carry out actions that can “take” a 
species.  Section 10 of the ESA offers these options.  It has exemptions for 
certain scientific practices that will benefit the species (Sec. 10(a)(1)(A)), 
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native Alaskans for subsistence purposes (Sec. 10(e)(1)), or if a 
“conservation plan” is enacted (Sec. 10(a)(2)(A)).  These plans, known as 
habitat conservation plans (HCP’s), involve a written agreement between 
the applicant and the FWS that allows the applicant to incidentally take a 
species in any normal activity the applicant carries out if they agree to 
certain mitigation strategies, such as setting aside habitat. The landowner 
not only gets the incidental take permit, they also get assurances from the 
FWS that they will not be subject to any additional regulations if another 
endangered species is found on their land or if the management plans for 
the current endangered species changes.  This assurance is known as the 
“no surprises” policy (Noss, et al, 1996).  These HCP’s were added to the 
ESA in 1983 (Frampton, 1996).  HCP’s were generally not used much until 
the Clinton Administration, which used the plans to increase collaboration 
among people and organizations impacted by endangered species 
(Frampton, 1996).    
Recovery Plans 
The final component of the ESA is recovery plans.  They were first 
required by the 1978 amendments (NRC, 1995).  After a species has 
become listed, a recovery plan is mandated to be developed.  Currently, 
approximately 80% of listed species have recovery plans (Taylor, 2003).  




“(i) a description of such site-specific 
management actions as may be necessary to 
achieve the plan’s goal for the conservation and 
survival of the species; 
(ii) objective, measurable criteria which, when 
met, would result in a determination, in 
accordance with the provisions of this section, 
that the species be removed from the list; and 
(iii) estimates of the time required and the cost to 
carry out those measures needed to achieve the 
plan’s goal and to achieve intermediate steps 
toward that goal” (16 U.S.C. §1533 (f)(1)(B)). 
 
Thus, recovery plans are implemented with specific goals and objectives 
that will promote the expansion and recovery of the species.   
While recovery plans make sense theoretically, there have been 
numerous problems with them.  The NRC identifies the major problem as 
the absence of basic scientific knowledge (1995).  Because much of the 
basic scientific knowledge is lacking about the particular species, it is 
difficult to provide clear, concise objectives based on this science.    While 
most listed species have recovery plans, if the objectives are based on 
unknown scientific data, then the plans might be ineffectual.   
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History of Critical Habitat  
 
Historically, critical habitat has been a controversial issue.  The ESA 
itself gives critical habitat the same protections that are given to the 
species themselves (Yagerman, 1990).  Congress recognized the 
importance of protecting the habitats on which the species depended.  If 
the species’ habitat is not protected, then it is increasingly likely that the 
species will not recover and, eventually, go extinct.  The Act states that 
“the purposes are to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon 
which endangered species and threatened species depend may be 
conserved” (16 U.S.C. §1531(b).  Congress termed this habitat “critical 
habitat.”   
Unfortunately, the implementation of critical habitat by the FWS has 
not been ideal.    The original 1973 ESA did not define what critical habitat 
was, nor did it construct a procedure for delineating critical habitat.  It just 
stated that protecting critical habitat should be a goal of the United 
States.  Congress delegated this responsibility to the FWS.  The FWS was 
able to regulatory define what habitat was “critical” (Yagerman, 1990).  
This gave the agencies “broad discretion” (Snape, 1995) The FWS then 
decided to define critical habitat to include habitat that was necessary 




However, Congress decided that this definition was too broad and 
chose to narrow the definition of “critical habitat” statutorily in the 1978 
Amendments.  When the ESA was passed, most legislators did not realize 
what they were getting.  They didn’t realize what was biologically 
necessary for preservation of species.  “The original ESA likely failed to 
define ‘critical habitat’ because congressional policy makers did not fully 
anticipate the political ramifications when ‘habitat’ is construed in a 
biologically meaningful way” (Yagerman, 1990, 830).   The 1978 
Amendments are very important in that they set the role for critical 
habitat.  These Amendments responded, for the most part, to the snail 
darter controversy (Houck, 1993).   
The snail darter is a three –inch fish that was listed by the FWS as 
endangered in 1975 (Peterson, 1999).  The only known habitat for the 
darter coincided with the Tellico Dam which was being constructed by 
the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA).  The dam was being built in the snail 
darters’ designated critical habitat (Percival, 2000).  The Environmental 
Defense Fund brought suit against the TVA to halt the construction of the 
dam, which was 80% complete (Reisner, 1987).  Eventually, the suit made 
it all the way to the Supreme Court, who held for the conservation group 
and halted the construction of the dam.  Many members of Congress felt 
that this was a misinterpretation of the ESA (Peterson, 1999).  In response to 
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this controversy, Congress added the above definition of critical habitat 
and added that “except in those circumstances determined by the 
Secretary, critical habitat shall not include the entire geographical area 
which can be occupied by the threatened or endangered species (16 
U.S.C. §1532(5)(b)).   
The 1978 Amendments also included the addition of economic 
considerations for critical habitat designation.  Congress was afraid that 
small, esoteric species could shut down other public works projects.  
Quoting Sen. James Sasser (D-Tenn.), Peterson states, “I do not believe 
that most of the Members who voted for that bill ever intended it to be 
used to halt water resources development” (1999, 486).  The 1978 
Amendments also fashioned the procedure for critical habitat 
designation.   It created the schedule that the FWS must follow and 
allowed for the consideration of economic impacts.  Thus, the scope of 
critical habitat was limited (Yagerman, 1990).  Also, those species listed 
from 1973 to 1978 are not required to have critical habitat.  This means 
that some of the earliest, most endangered species do not have critical 
habitat.  An example of this is the grizzly bear (Yagerman, 1990).   
Finally, the 1978 Amendments also introduced the “God Squad” as 
another escape clause for exempting species.  It is interesting to note that 
the “God Squad” was convened for the snail darter and it was 
determined not to exempt it from the ESA.   But perhaps the most 
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detrimental aspect of the snail darter controversy was that FWS decided 
to not list species or designated critical habitat if they could get away 
with it.  “The snail darter controversy had several consequences.  First, FWS 
became more cautious about listing species, using its discretion to avoid 
the mandate of section 4.  …In the wake of Tennessee Valley Authority v. 
Hill, FWS began to exercise its discretion to avoid controversy, even if that 
meant circumventing section 4” (Peterson, 1999, 486).  The FWS decided 
to use the “warranted but precluded” category to delay listing (Houck, 
1993).  Because there was such a backlog of species waiting to become 
listed, the FWS used this to justify not listing species.  They claimed they just 
did not have the resources.     
Prudency 
In 1986 the Department of the Interior (DOI) introduced regulations 
that drastically changed critical habitat.  DOI altered the definition of 
“recovery” so that “adverse modification” and “jeopardy” mean basically 
the same thing.  Both of the terms were defined in the language of both 
survival and recovery of the species (Houck, 1993).  Further, because of 
the word “both” in order for an action to be found unlawful, it had to 
affect recovery and survival.   If it only affected recovery and not survival, 
then it was permitted (Houck, 1993).  Because of these definitions, the FWS 
no longer saw any benefit to critical habitat above jeopardy and, in the 
majority of cases, decided that designating critical habitat was “not 
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prudent.”  The FWS saw the use of “prudency” as an escape clause, a 
way to legally not designate critical habitat.   
However, this was contrary to Congressional intent.  Congress 
intended for “prudency” to give some latitude to the FWS, to give them 
some freedom for stronger mandates (Patlis, 2001).  Unfortunately, FWS 
took that latitude and greatly expanded it.  Whereas Congress intended 
“prudency” to be the exception, used only in “rare circumstances” the 
FWS used it as the rule (Patlis, 2001).  As Hicks states, “the 1986 regulations, 
although introducing seemingly subtle changes, are a clear attempt to 
restrict the critical habitat protections of the ESA” (2000, 4).  Basically, the 
FWS did away with many benefits of critical habitat designation.  Because 
of this, they then decided not to designate it.  As Hicks states, “Historically, 
this protection (critical habitat) has had enormous practical 
consequences, but subsequent to the Departments of Interior’s 1986 
amendments to regulations implementing section 7 of the ESA, it is 
doubtful that critical habitat has any practical value.”  While the 
regulations did strip a number of benefits from critical habitat, it did not 
strip them all.  Some of the other benefits of critical habitat are the 
information requirements it has, the Courts deference to critical habitat, 
and requirement of federal consultations.  These will be discussed below.   
Because of the use of prudency, critical habitat is not designated in 
the large majority of cases.  As of June 2003, there were 1,263 listed 
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species with only 417 (33%) having critical habitat designated (GAO, 
2003).  Throughout the late 1980’s and majority of the 1990’s, critical 





As can be seen, the number of critical habitats designated is very low.  
Even in 1985, with approximately 25 designations, there were 
approximately 60 species listed (GAO, 2003).  Thus, even in an active year, 
less than half of the listings are accompanied with critical habitat 




In 1997 the FWS was challenged by conservation groups in Court 
over its use of “prudency.”   In Natural Resources Defense Council v. U.S. 
Department of the Interior (113 F.3rd 1121), the circuit court ruled against 
the “no benefit” rationale and against the use of “prudency” (Patlis, 
2001).  Because of this ruling, conservation groups are now suing the FWS 
over critical habitat designations.  In almost every case, the Courts have 
ruled for the conservation groups, “requiring the Service to designate 
critical habitat, rejecting either the ‘not determinable’ or the ‘not 
prudent’ findings” (Patlis, 2001, 183).  Because of this, there has been a 
rebirth in critical habitat designations.  This can also be seen in Fig. 2, 
beginning in 1999.   
However, these designations have come under attack from the 
other side, from private landowners.  They claim the economic analyses 
performed for the critical habitat designations are flawed.  Because the 
FWS does not see any benefit from critical habitat, they also did not see 
any economic impact.  In New Mexico Cattle Growers Association 
(NMCGA) v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (248 F. 3d 1277), the Tenth Circuit 
held against the FWS’ economic analysis.  They invalidated the “baseline 
approach” that the FWS had used (Sinden, forthcoming).  The baseline 
approach examined only the economic impacts above and beyond the 
impacts from listing.  Because the FWS saw no additional benefit of critical 
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habitat above that of listing, it did not find any impact.  The Tenth Circuit 
Court “held that the language of the ESA clearly required consideration of 
economic impacts, and under FWS’ baseline method the consideration of 
economic impacts, the ESA was rendered meaningless” (Shingleton, 
2003).   The court concluded that the economic analysis must look at all of 
the impacts of critical habitat, even if it is partly attributable to other 
things, like listing.  Basically, the Tenth Circuit required that the FWS must 
conduct a formal economic analysis, not just an empty gesture.  In 
response to this decision, the FWS adopted a double baseline approach.  
This second baseline measures impacts that are caused by both critical 
habitat designation and listing (Sinden, forthcoming).  Thus, in the current 
economic analyses performed by the FWS, the original baseline, the 
impacts of critical habitat designation only, remain in the analysis but are 
augmented by this second baseline.   
Current Situation 
The current situation is not a hopeful one.  The past few years have 
been very litigious.  Both environmental groups and private landowner 
groups have been suing the FWS for either not designating critical habitat 
on schedule or for doing poor economic analyses.  Because of this, the 
FWS claims that they do not have the budget to carry out the many tasks 
of the ESA.   The critical habitat program within the FWS has always had 
an incredible small budget (Houck, 1993).  Because there is this budget 
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shortfall, the FWS claims that there is not enough money to designate 
critical habitat.  Craig Manson, Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and 
Parks, Department of the Interior, stated, “the system for designating 
critical habitat is broken.  A process that provides little real conservation 
benefit consumes enormous agency resources and imposes huge social 
and economic costs” (Manson, 2003).  
However, this is very possibly due to the consistent under funding 
the listing program receives.  A recent internal analysis conducted by the 
FWS found that it would cost approximately $153 million to administer the 
backlog of listing and critical habitat designation.  This year, the current 
administration requested $12.3 million (Vickery, 2003).  In fact, after 
Congress appropriated this amount, the FWS was invited by Congress to 
request more money but choose not to (Endangered Species Coalition, 
2003).  Unfortunately, this is not a new occurrence.  While appropriations 
have always been low, Interior has generally not requested a budget 
increase (Houck, 1993).  In fact, Interior has been aggressive in resisting 
increased funding.  Houck states, 
 “the Nature Conservancy proposed the Interior’s 
1990 budget for listing endangered species be 
increased from $3 million to $15 million-a minor 
sum in most federal budgets-a sum that would 
allow Interior to list an estimated 250 species per 
year.  Interior objected, stating that an increase 
for ‘this lower priority activity’ ran counter to the 
goal of reducing the federal deficit, more 
disturbingly, that ‘any significant increase in the 
number of species being listed each 
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year…would require a commensurate increase in 
funding for recovery, consultations, law 
enforcement and related activities’.  Voila.  The 
problem is not money if one refuses to ask for 
money” (Houck, 1993).    
  
It should be noted that thirteen years later, the level of funding still 
has not reached the level recommended by the Nature Conservancy.  
The fact that Interior would refuse to increase funding provides evidence 
for their likely disdain for the critical habitat program.   Because they do 
not have the resources necessary to complete listing and critical habitat 
designation according to the schedule, they are open to litigation, which 
then leads to more litigation, which takes more money.  It is a classic 
Catch-22 that has lead to the current situation.      
 23
 
Review of Economic Analysis 
Methodology Used by the FWS 
 
Before the New Mexico Cattle Growers case, the FWS used a 
“baseline approach” that analyzed the difference in the world with and 
without critical habitat.  After this approach was invalidated, the FWS 
switched to the double baseline approach.  This is the same analysis that 
the FWS had been conducted, with the addition of another baseline.    
The baseline that is added is the “without section 7/with section 7” 
baseline (Industrial Econ., 2002).  This baseline determines the impacts that 
arise from listing of the species.  The “without section 7” situation is the 
state of the world without listing the species.  This would include any 
applicable local, state, or federal laws, regulations, and ordinances 
(Industrial Econ, 2002).  The “with section 7” situation analyzes activities 
that would change after the species has been listed.  This baseline is used 
to determine the upper-bound of the effects of critical habitat 
designation.  It should capture all of the effects of listing and designating 
critical habitat.  As a report by Industrial Economics notes, 
 “By defining the upper-bound estimate to 
include both jeopardy and adverse modification 
provisions of section 7, the analysis recognized 
that, in some cases, it may be difficult to 
differentiate between the two sources of impact.  
This approach is adopted in order to ensure that 
any critical habitat impacts that may occur co-
extensively with the listing of the species (i.e., 
jeopardy) are not overlooked in the analysis” 
(Industrial Econ. 2002, paragraph 25).   
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The second baseline is the original baseline the FWS used for the 
economic analyses, the “with and without critical habitat” baseline.  The 
“without critical habitat” situation identifies the state of the world where 
the species is only listed while the “with critical habitat” situation identifies 
those impacts that arise from designation of critical habitat.  Because 
there will be fewer impacts from designating critical habitat than from 
listing and critical habitat, this second baseline represents that lower-
bound estimate of the analysis.  As previously mentioned, it is very difficult 
to separate the activities that arise solely from listing the species from 
those that arose solely from the designation of critical habitat.   Therefore, 
Industrial Economics argues that it is best to get a range.    
There are a number of controversies in the way that the FWS 
performs their economic analysis.   First, although the language of the ESA 
does not specify the use of a cost-benefit analysis to the economic 
analysis used, that is what the FWS has traditionally used.  The costs of 
designating critical habitat are measured and weighed against the 
benefits of critical habitat designation.  The costs of the critical habitat 
designation would be equivalent to the “benefits of exclusion” while the 
benefits of critical habitat would be the “benefits of specifying.”  Second, 
many of the economic analyses that have recently been performed 
seem to be heavily biased towards the costs, quantifying many costs and 
rarely quantifying benefits (Industrial Econ., 2000, 2002).  For example, in 
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the analysis done for the Mexican spotted owl (Strix occidentalis lucida), 
there are a total of 51 pages, excluding references.  There are a total of 
less than two pages discussing benefits (Industrial Econ, 2000).  While this 
fact alone does not necessarily bias the analysis, it does give an indication 
of what impacts the FWS are focusing on.  In addition, the fact that the 
benefits, unlike the costs, were not generally quantified can add an 
additional bias towards the costs (Sinden, forthcoming).   
While the FWS has typically not tried to quantify benefits, there have 
been two recent occurrences of the FWS attempting this.  Unfortunately, 
they have not had much luck.  In a recent analysis for the Gulf Sturgeon, 
in July, 2002, the FWS made an attempt to quantify benefits but eventually 
concluded that it is too difficult to “fully describe and accurately quantify 
the benefits of the designation” (Sinden, quoting Gulf Sturgeon draft 
economic analysis).  Because of these difficulties, the FWS states that 
benefits should not be quantified but maintained in biological terms and 
then weighed against quantified costs.  Additionally, the FWS has made 
an attempt to quantify a non-use value for an endangered species.  In 
the recent draft economic analysis for the Pygmy Owl, they performed a 
“benefits transfer” to attempt to get a numerical non-use value for the owl 
(Industrial Economics, 2002).  Unfortunately, it is difficult to attribute all of 
this value to critical habitat.  While critical habitat is an important 
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conservation strategy, only some of this non-use value for the species itself 
can be attributed to critical habitat.   
In addition to this general lack of quantification of benefits, there 
seems to be an increasing tendency to find and quantify any type of cost 
possible.  For example, most of the first economic analyses performed by 
the FWS had federal consultation costs as their main component.  In more 
recent analyses, more diverse costs have been added (Industrial Econ., 
2002).  Thus, the quantified costs of critical habitat appear to be 
increasing while the unquantified benefits of critical habitat remain static.  
Because the benefits of the critical habitat are not quantified, it can be 
difficult to empirically compare them to the costs.  If the FWS is 
overestimated the true costs of critical habitat designation or is 
underestimating the true benefits of critical habitat designation, this type 
of unbalanced analysis can lead to less critical habitat being designated 
than is optimal.  These benefits of critical habitat will be discussed in the 
following section.    
Further, if the Secretary of the Interior is under political pressure to 
not designate a certain area critical habitat, then it can be very simple to 
argue that the quantified costs of designating critical habitat outweigh 
the unquantified benefits.  This gives the Secretary a great deal of leeway 
when determining exclusions from critical habitat.  As Patlis notes, “as 
currently written, the critical habitat provision is a startling section which is 
 27
 
wholly inconsistent with the rest of the legislation.  It constitutes a loophole 
which could readily be abused by any Secretary of the Interior who is 
vulnerable to political pressure, or who is not sympathetic to the basic 
purposes of the Endangered Species Act” (2001, 8).     
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Current Issues in Critical Habitat Designation 
 
There are a number of issues surrounding the designation of critical 
habitat and the use of economic analysis.  The first revolves around the 
question: “does critical habitat provide any benefit to the species?”  
Based on the statements of the FWS given below and some statistical 
studies, the answer is a definitive, “yes” (USFWS(b), 2003, Taylor, et al. 2003, 
USFWS(b), 2000, Rachlinski, 1997).   
A second issue involves the type of economic analysis performed.  
When the FWS conducts their analyses, they generally do not attempt to 
quantify benefits.  This can bias the final designation of critical habitat by 
overstated the total net cost of the designation (Sinden, forthcoming).  
Therefore, in order to avoid this bias, the FWS should either forgo a formal 
economic analysis for a rough comparison of costs and benefits (as 
Sinden argues) or it should make a concerted effort to quantify both costs 
and benefits (as this thesis argues).   
Third, and perhaps most important, what are the economic impacts 
of critical habitat?  What are the costs and benefits to society of 
designating critical habitat?  While there are transaction costs and project 
modifications associated with critical habitat, there are also a number of 
“secondary benefits”, such as avoided cost of public infrastructure, 
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maintenance of option value for the species and habitat, and avoided 
loss of ecosystem services.   
Finally, what should the structure of the economic analysis be?  
Currently, the FWS uses a double baseline which not only measures the 
economic impact of critical habitat but also the impact of listing.  This is 
contrary to the intent of Congress; only critical habitat designation can 
consider economic impacts.  Therefore, a single baseline should be used.   
Benefits? 
The most basic question to ask about critical habitat is: are there 
any benefits?  If there are no benefits, then it is easy to argue that critical 
habitat is a waste.  There would be no reason to designate critical habitat 
because it does not benefit the species.  If there are net benefits, then 
critical habitat should be designated for each species.  The FWS has 
historically denied that there are any major benefits while most 
conservation organizations have consistently stated that there are.  This 
has been the root of the litigation surrounding critical habitat.  Because 
FWS generally argues that critical habitat is a waste of time, personnel, 
and funding, they have attempted to bypass critical habitat designation 
for most species.  Meanwhile, many conservation organizations feel that 
there are benefits, so they sue the FWS to try to force them to designate.  
Therefore, if this question could be answered, it would be a step towards a 
less litigious process of critical habitat designation. 
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It should be noted that there are different kinds of benefits that 
critical habitat provides. There are educational, administrative, and 
conservation benefits.  Educational, or informational, benefits arise when, 
through the listing and critical habitat designation process, the public is 
made aware of the characteristics and habitat needs of the species.   
Administrative benefits are those that arise from activities that must 
be carried out by the federal government.  For example, when a federal 
agency must consult with the FWS to determine whether an endangered 
species is harmed by a federal activity, this can lead to a benefit to the 
species.  It might protect the species from potential harm.  While 
administrative benefits arise from listing a species, they also arise from 
critical habitat designation.   
Conservation benefits would be ones that contribute directly to the 
recovery of the species.  An example of a conservation benefit would be 
where certain activities are modified in response to critical habitat 
designation.  When critical habitat is designated, certain activities, like 
grazing and timbering, must be altered.  These modifications of activities 
benefit the species by (hopefully) improving the habitat.   
The FWS accepts that critical habitat provides educational and 
administrative benefits but claims that it provides no additional 
conservation benefits above listing (USFWS(a), 2000).  In addition, the FWS, 
in the economic analyses for critical habitat, generally acknowledges 
 31
 
other benefits of species preservation, such as existence value, 
recreational use value, and certain ecosystem services (Sinden, 
forthcoming).  However, the FWS is “hesitant” to assign these benefits 
directly to critical habitat (Sinden, forthcoming).  Because they do not 
believe that critical habitat contributes to the conservation of the species, 
then these other benefits cannot be applied to critical habitat.   
 Educational Benefits 
Educational benefits of critical habitat are an important aspect of 
critical habitat designation. While discussing the critical habitat 
designation for the Spaldings Catchfly, Silene spaldingii, the FWS states 
that critical habitat designation “may also provide educational or 
informational benefits” (USFWS(b), 2000, 21712).   During the listing and 
critical habitat designation process, the FWS provides information about 
the species and its habitat to the public hoping to get public response 
and comments.  This information can provide the public with important 
information that they can use to have more informed discussion about the 
particular species.  Thus, educational benefits are not exclusive to critical 
habitat, they also occur during the listing process.  These processes give 
the public important information about characteristics and needs of the 
species and helps delineate what type of habitat is needed.  It is usually 
important to get the local affected population involved in the critical 
habitat designation.  If the public is not involved, then the conservation 
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benefits of critical habitat can possibly be sabotaged.  For instance, in the 
case of charismatic megafauna, like gray wolves, if the public is not 
involved then, in certain situations, it is possible for the “shoot, shovel, and 
shut-up” strategy to become established.    
According to Wilcove, et al, “more than half of the species in the 
U.S. that are protected by the Act have at least 81% of their habitat on 
non-federal land.  Between a third and a half of the protected species do 
not occur at all on federal lands” (1996, 2).   In addition, “for species found 
entirely on private property, only 3% are improving, and the ratio of 
declining species to improving species is 9 to 1”  (Wilcove, et al. 1996, 2).  
Because of the number of endangered species that occur on private 
lands, it is imperative to get the local population involved.  They need to 
know when they have an endangered species on their land and they 
need to know what they can do to help with recovery.  Yaffee, quoting a 
local business owner, states “people were dying for information…to do 
the right thing.  They were trying to make their wrongs right” (2000, 26).   
The FWS has generally recognized this educational benefit of critical 
habitat.  They state that critical habitat gives,  
“benefits to the species by informing the public 
(via newspaper articles, newspaper notices, 
public meeting, public hearings, etc.) of areas 
that are important for species recovery and 
where conservation action would be most 
effective.  Designation of critical habitat helps 
focus conservation activities for a listed species 
on the areas that contain the physical and 
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biological features that are essential for 
conservation of that species, and alerts the 
public and land-managing agencies to the 
importance of those areas” (USFWS(b), 2003). 
 
Another aspect of the educational benefit is the certainty that it 
can provide.  Local landowners are anxious to know whether their land 
has been designated or not.  This information will let them know what 
actions they need to take, if any.  During the comment period for the 
designation of critical habitat for the Alabama Sturgeon, the FWS 
“received numerous comments from both proponents and opponents of 
the species listing that favored designation of critical habitat” (USFWS(a), 
2000).  This indicates that, at least for the Alabama sturgeon, local people 
wanted certainty about critical habitat.   
Administrative Benefits 
Another class of benefits the FWS recognizes is administrative 
benefits.  Like educational benefits, administrative benefits arise from both 
listing and critical habitat designation.  There are two types of 
administrative benefits.  The first administrative benefit occurs when a 
proposed federal action is changed or modified due to the consultation 
process.  If a proposed action is believed to harm or adversely affect 
critical habitat, the action must be changed to ensure that the habitat is 
not harmed.  Thus, if there is both critical habitat and the species are 
present, then the administrative benefits cannot be attributed solely to the 
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species or to critical habitat.  However, if there is no species present, the 
benefit can be attributed solely to the presence of critical habitat.  The 
FWS recognizes that “section 7 consultation might be triggered only if 
critical habitat is designated” (USFWS(a), 2000, 26457).  Therefore, by 
protecting habitat that is currently unoccupied, critical habitat can 
contribute to the recovery and expansion of endangered species.   
An additional type of administrative benefit is the deference that 
courts give to critical habitat.  In Catron County Board of Commissioners v. 
United States Fish and Wildlife Service (75 F.3d 1429 (10th Cir. 1996)), the 
court held “that ESA procedures did not displace NEPA requirements, and 
that actual impact does flow from a CHD” (Shingleton, 2003).  Shingleton 
states, “Catron County established the significance of critical habitat 
designations and indicated that the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals would 
not view them as an ineffectual addition to the listing process, but rather 
as an additional measure of protection that would have substantial 
impacts”.  In a number of cases, Courts will not stop a proposed activity 
unless there is critical habitat present.   For example, during the snail darter 
controversy, the “Supreme Court relied explicitly on the designation of 
critical habitat for the Snail Darter to enjoin a federal dam” (Houck, 1993, 
309).   
Unfortunately, while the FWS recognizes the presence of these 
benefits, they do not believe that these benefits are very important.  
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When making general statements about critical habitat, the FWS 
generally states that there are no benefits of critical habitat designation.  
When the FWS are making particular statements about specific critical 
habitat designations, they admit to educational and administrative 
benefits.  This possibly indicates that the FWS does not think that these 
benefits are important enough to contribute to the recovery of the 
species.   
Conservation Benefits 
The third class of benefits of critical habitat is conservation benefits.  
Traditionally, the FWS feels that critical habitat provides little or no 
conservation benefit to the species.  They have stated this many times, 
from the beginning of the ESA (USFWS(a), 2003).  The FWS states that 
critical habitat is redundant, duplicating protections offered by listing.  
They claim that “in most circumstances, the designation of “official” 
critical habitat is of little additional value for most listed species, (and) it 
consumes large amounts of conservation resources” (USFWS, 2002).  Craig 
Manson, Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and Parks, has testified 
before the Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife, and Water of the Senate 
Committee on Environment and Public Works, that critical habitat does 
nothing to improve species conservation.  In May 2003, the FWS published 
a document “Critical Habitat-Questions and Answers” where they 
answered questions regarding critical habitat.  In this document, the FWS 
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state that “designating critical habitat for species already on the 
endangered species list provides little conservation benefit to species” 
(USFWS(a), 2003).   
Unfortunately, there have not been many studies to analyze 
whether critical habitat encourages recovery of the species.  Two of these 
studies were done by Rachlinski and Taylor, et al.  These studies analyzed 
FWS ESA progress reports.  These progress reports provide information to 
Congress on the progress of the ESA.  The reports give basic information 
on numbers of the ESA program, such as how many species are listed, 
how many species have critical habitat, and determines how many 
species are “improving,” “stable,” and “declining” (Taylor, 2003).  
Increases in the number of species in the “improving,” and to an extent 
the “stable” category, would indicate that the ESA is working (Rachlinski, 
1997).   
The Rachlinski study used the reports from 1989-1990, 1991-1992, and 
1993-1994.  He conducted a statistical analysis determining how different 
aspects of the ESA, such as critical habitat, recovery plans, and length of 
time listed, affected the status of the species.  Rachlinski determined that 
critical habitat shifted species from “declining” to “stable.”  While this 
trend was only marginally significant, it still shows that critical habitat is 
effective in improving species.  Rachlinski states, “each aspect of the 
Act’s protection-listing, designating critical habitat, and adopting a 
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species recovery plan-benefits listed species” (emphasis added) (1997, 
383).       
The second study is one that has been recently released by Taylor, 
et al.  Similar to the Rachlinski study, it also finds that critical habitat does 
indeed provide additional conservation benefits above simply listing the 
species.  It analyzes the three most recent progress reports, two given to 
Congress in June of 2003 and the third given in 1999.  The reports are from 
1995-1996, 1997-1998 and 1999-2000.  Their primary finding is that critical 
habitat is “strongly and positively correlated with improving trend in all 
three reports” (Taylor, 20003, 3).  Further, in the 1995-1996 study, critical 
habitat was negatively correlated with declining trend.  In the other two 
reports, there was no correlation between critical habitat and declining 
trend.  Taylor, et al, interprets their results to mean that critical habitat 
moves species from a stable to an improving trend.  Other factors, such as 
time of listing and recovery plans, move species from a declining to a 
stable trend.  After the species has become stabilized, critical habitat is 
important because it allows the species to increase in numbers and 
expand its habitat.  These are important steps in a species recovery and, 
eventually, it’s delisting from the ESA.  This is in contrast to the Rachlinski 
study where critical habitat was found to move species from “declining” 
to “stable” (Rachlinski, 1997).  The reason for the difference in results is 
likely due to the different statistical analyses used and the different 
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progress reports used.  Despite this difference, both studies indicate that 
critical habitat does indeed have benefits.  These analyses indicate that 
the FWS is mistaken when it claims that critical habitat provides little or no 
additional benefit.   
Based upon the fact that the FWS admits to educational and 
administrative benefits and the two analyses that indicate that there are 
conservation benefits, there do seem to be benefits of critical habitat.  It 
gives important information to local residents, protects habitat that could 
be needed for recovery of a species, and helps the recovery of the 
species.  Because of these benefits, in most cases, critical habitat should 
be designated for all species.  While it is possible for the economic costs of 
critical habitat designation to outweigh the benefits of critical habitat 
designation, this scenario is likely quite rare.  The ESA is designed to 
“provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered 
species and threatened species depend may be conserved” (16 U.S.C. 
1531(b)).  Critical habitat can be an important step in this process and, 
therefore, should to be designated. 
Type of Economic Analysis 
The next important question is: what kind of economic analysis 
should be used?  What does it mean that the Secretary of the FWS “may 
exclude any area from critical habitat if he determines that the benefits of 
such exclusion outweigh the benefits of specifying such area as part of 
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the critical habitat” (16 U.S.C §1533(b)(2))?  While the FWS has interpreted 
this to mean a CBA, what they really have been doing are cost analyses.  
They usually do not make much of an attempt to quantify the benefits, or 
even discuss the benefits.  This FWS interpretation, if continued, can 
possibly lead to less critical habitat being designated than is optimal.  
Because the benefits are not formally incorporated into the analysis, it is 
increasingly likely that the Secretary will determine that the costs will 
outweigh the benefits, which can possibly justify the exclusion of many 
areas.  In fact, this has already begun to happen.  In a recent critical 
habitat designation for vernal pool species in California and Oregon, the 
FWS excluded a number of counties from the designation because they 
ruled that the economic costs would be too excessive (USFWS(c), 2003).  It 
is possible that, if the benefits were quantified and included in the analysis, 
these counties would not have been excluded.   
An interpretation of what the economic analysis should be has 
been offered by Sinden (forthcoming).  She argues for a “short-cut” 
analysis that gives some consideration to cost and benefits but does not 
require the substantial resources of a complete CBA.  While this appears 
to be exactly what the FWS currently is doing, Sinden is arguing 
preemptively for a basic analysis, rather than a formal CBA.  She sees the 
current litigious situation driving the FWS to a more complete, formalized 
economic analysis.  She attempts to argue that this is contrary to the 
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intentions of Congress and that critical habitat should not be determined 
by simple numbers.  In addition, her analysis would likely include a more 
impartial discussion of costs and benefits.   
Sinden lists numerous problems with the current economic analysis 
performed by the FWS.  She argues that the FWS’ current method for 
quantifying costs “clearly involve[s] innumerable layers of simplifying 
assumptions, each of which is highly vulnerable to attack.”  This leads to 
the current litigious state of affairs.  In addition, CBA tries to measure vastly 
different values by a single metric, the dollar.  For instance, it tries to 
measure lost profits to a project developer and the existence or intrinsic 
value of a species with the same measure.  Further, Sinden argues that the 
analysis corrupts the democratic process.  Because the CBA gives a single 
number, or a range of numbers, this might give it “a false patina of 
scientific certainty.”  This “false patina” can shift the discussion from a 
value discussion where the local community feels free to participate to a 
“scientific calculus” where only experts have the requisite knowledge.  This 
shift can disenfranchise the local population and undermine the local 
support needed for resourceful recovery.   
Sinden argues that in the 1970’s, when the ESA was written, 
Congress regularly eschewed formal CBA in favor of less formal analyses, 
because it was highly skeptical about formal CBA (Sinden).  Instead of 
these formal analyses, Congress used other regulatory mechanisms, such 
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as feasibility standards.  These standards, such as the “Best Available 
Technology (BAT)” standard under the Clean Water Act, operate under 
the assumption that the benefits gained will outweigh the costs.  
Therefore, there is no reason to waste valuable resources to justify the 
action.  In the 1970’s and 1980’s these feasibility standards were 
challenged by industry (Sinden).  They argued that these standards 
implicitly require a CBA.  However, the D.C. Circuit rejected the argument, 
“holding that Congress had consciously chosen a short-cut standard in 
order to avoid miring the agency in time consuming and costly studies 
that were unlikely to yield conclusive results anyway” (Sinden).  The 
Supreme Court supported this decision, showing a “general presumption 
disfavoring cost-benefits analysis” (Sinden).  Based upon these facts, 
Sinden argues that “Congress did not intend to compel the agencies to 
conduct formal economic cost-benefit analyses in connect with critical 
habitat designation” (Sinden).   She states,  
“any attempt to apply formal economic cost-
benefit analysis to critical habitat designations 
will illogically force incommensurable values into 
a common metric, will be hopelessly 
indeterminate, will undermine the democratic 
process, and will divert precious resources from 
the real business of protecting imperiled species” 
(Sinden, forthcoming).   
 
However, while Sinden offers a very insightful solution to the current 
litigious situation, her solution, a rough “apples-to-oranges” comparison, is 
probably not politically feasible.  There is not enough political will to make 
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such a dramatic change in the ESA.  The ESA was last reauthorized in 1992 
(Hodge, 1997).  The reason for this stagnation is that no political or interest 
group has enough political power to effect their changes.  Due to the 
large numbers of diverse groups wanting to alter the ESA, the final 
outcome of an ESA revision is uncertain.  Because of this uncertainty 
surrounding the outcome of a challenge to the ESA, no group will 
challenge the current manifestation.   
Sinden’s argument for a less formal analysis requires not only a 
major philosophical shift in the way the FWS implements the ESA but also 
would require a major revision of the ESA.  If the ESA was not revised, then 
different interests will sue, arguing that their interests were not adequately 
represented in the economic analysis.  Sinden herself recognizes this.  She 
states, 
 “though it (the FWS) may start by performing 
rough apples-to-oranges comparisons in order to 
avoid quantifying benefits, a determination to 
either exclude or not exclude based on such an 
analysis will inevitably lead the disappointed 
constituency to sue claiming that benefits should 
have been quantified to ensure an objective 
and accurate cost-benefit analysis.”   
 
Her solution to this problem is for the FWS to “take a stand in favor of 
a ‘short-cut’ approach … and unless it is backed up by the courts, this 
political dynamic will lead ineluctably to a more and more quantitative, 
complicated, and costly analysis.”  Unfortunately, as mentioned above, 
there is not the political will to fulfill her strategy.   
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An alternative to Sinden’s “short-cut” approach is the polar 
opposite: an analysis that makes every attempt to quantify costs and 
benefits.  This analysis would be similar to the CBA performed by the FWS; 
the major difference being that benefits are quantified to the extent 
possible.  It is very important that both costs and benefits are quantified to 
the extent possible.  As Sinden states, a “comparison that expresses costs 
in terms of dollars and benefits in quantitative terms will inevitably privilege 
cost over benefits and thereby skew public debate” (Sinden, 
forthcoming).  Another reason for quantifying benefits to the extent 
possible is because only the numbers of the economic analysis are 
published in the Federal Register.  When the proposed critical habitat rule 
is published in the Federal Register, only the numerical results are included.  
The unquantified benefits are not included.  This will also skew public 
opinion because the public only sees the costs and not the benefits.   
Economic Impacts of Critical Habitat  
It is important to note that the benefits that are included in the 
economic analysis are different than the benefits of critical habitat 
designation.  The benefits of critical habitat designation accrue to the 
listed species.  When critical habitat is designated, the species get the 
educational, administrative, and conservation benefits discussed above.  
The benefits that are analyzed in the economic analysis are economic 
benefits to society.  These benefits include avoided loss of the species 
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existence value, potentially higher land values, and avoided loss of 
ecosystem services.      
As discussed earlier, the FWS is very good at quantifying the costs of 
critical habitat.  These costs usually center on lost development 
opportunities, modifications of proposed projects, and federal 
consultations.   Therefore, the following discussion will center on economic 
benefits of critical habitat designation and quantification methods.   
There are a number of economic benefits of critical habitat.  Most 
of these benefits can fit into one of three value categories.  These are use 
value, option value, and non-use value (Tietenberg, 2003).  Use value 
“reflects the direct use of the environmental resource” (Tietenberg, 2003, 
37).  Examples include timber harvesting for a forest, using water from a 
river for irrigation, and recreation from a forest.  Option value is the “value 
people place on having the option to use a resource in the future” 
(Tietenberg, 2003, 615).  An example is preserving a forest for future uses, 
such as recreation or timber.  Non-use, or passive use values are “resource 
values that arise from motivations other than personal use” (Tietenberg, 
2003, 614).  The most used example of a non-use value is existence value.  
This is the value that a person has for something just for knowing it exists.  
For example, many people value the artic caribou even though they 
never plan to go the Artic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR).   
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There are many use values associated with land designated as 
critical habitat.  When these are interpreted by economists, some of these 
are costs and some are benefits.  For example, land prices could 
decrease because of a hypothetical stigma attached to critical habitat.  
Or it is possible that, if the land already has land restriction present, land 
prices will increase because the preservation of habitat improves the 
quality of the surrounding land.  This change in value would depend on 
the specific context.   
Examples of a use value that will always be a cost are the 
transaction costs associated with critical habitat.  These are the 
consultations the federal agencies must engage in in order to avoid harm 
to the species or its habitat.  As the FWS has demonstrated in the 
economic analyses, these can be substantial.  For example, Industrial 
Economics estimated the total consultation costs for the cactus 
ferruginous pygmy-owl to be $13.7 million (2002).   
An example of a use value that will be a benefit is the reduced 
possibility of extinction of the protected species.  This could increase local 
recreation, such as birdwatching or wildlife watching, which would help 
the local economy.  These use values are fairly easy to determine based 
on standard economic methods.  Once the different uses of the land are 
chosen, the effect on the local, regional, and, in some cases, national 
economies can be simulated by economists.  It should be recognized that 
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numbers attached to the measurement of these values can be 
substantial.  For example, Kiker et al estimated an “annual net benefit 
accruing…from rural natural lands [in Northeast Florida] of $1.5 billion” 
(2003, 2).  These benefits arose from both production activities, like timber, 
and from amenity values, like recreation.   
These use values can be seen as actual changes in the economy, 
such as decreased timber sales or increased recreational opportunities.  
These values can be measured directly.  Other use values can be 
estimated by using the travel cost method (TCM) or the hedonic property 
method.  TCM is used to measure use values by measuring how much 
people pay to travel to a site.  This travel cost is seen as a way to measure 
the value of the use of a natural resource.  TCM is used mainly for 
recreational values (Tietenberg, 2003).    
The hedonic property method is “a valuation technique that allows 
the value of an environmental amenity to be determined from differences 
in the values of property exposed to different levels of the amenity” 
(Tietenberg, 2003, 611).  The hedonic property method uses regression 
techniques to try to separate the effect that the target resource has on 
the property.  For example, property values change in relation to the 
distance from a lake.  The regression can isolate this effect by controlling 
all other variables.    
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It should be noted that there are many types of use values that can 
be benefits of critical habitat.  Recreation could increase because of the 
preservation of natural lands, ecosystem services could be maintained 
because of less development, and activities such as environmental 
damaging timber harvesting and grazing on public lands could be 
curtailed.  All of these different benefits need to be considered and 
incorporated into the analysis.    
Option value and non-use values are more difficult to analyze.  
There is currently only one method for quantifying non-use values.  This is 
the contingent valuation method (CVM).  This is sophisticated survey that 
attempts to elicit people’s willingness-to-pay (WTP) for the target resource.  
It can be used to determine an individual’s WTP for the existence of the 
target resource.  After getting different individual’s WTP for the value, it is 
possible to aggregate and get a total non-use value for the resource.   
While it is theoretically possible to use the CVM to quantify this non-
use value, there are numerous critiques of the CVM.  Some of these 
critiques are strategic bias, information bias, and hypothetical bias 
(Tietenberg, 2003).  Strategic bias is when a respondent knowingly gives a 
wrong answer in order to influence the outcome.  People can over- or 
underestimate their value in order to change the final policy choice.  
Information bias can occur when people are forced to give values for a 
resource that they do not have experience with.  For example, if people 
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do not know anything about a particular species, then the value 
obtained would not be very meaningful.  The final bias is hypothetical 
bias.  Because the survey presents a hypothetical situation, some people 
do not give an accurate WTP.  They do not take the survey seriously and 
give trivial answers.   
Despite these critiques, the CVM is an accepted method for 
determining natural resource damages.  It also has been used to try to 
quantify non-use values for native wildlife.  After the Exxon Valdez oil spill, 
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) organized 
a committee to determine the validity of the CVM (Arrow et al., 1993).  
This committee was composed of economic experts, including two Nobel 
Laureates in economics (NOAA).  They determined that the CVM is a 
useful instrument, as long as certain precautions are taken.  These include: 
that the CV instrument use a referendum format, that face-to-face 
interviews should be used (although telephone interviews are 
acceptable), and that there is an adequate description of the program 
or policy (Arrow et al. , 1993).     
Unfortunately, by incorporating these precautions, individual CV 
studies can be very expensive.  Some economists have estimated that 
good CV studies would cost at least a few hundred thousand dollars 
(Harrison, 1996).  Because of this, it could impractical for the FWS to 
conduct a CV study for every possible critical habitat designation.  
 49
 
Fortunately, numerous CV studies have already been conducted on 
different species and there is a method for using values for existing studies 
and applying it to other endangered species, which is known as the 
benefits transfer method.   
Benefits transfer is the use of economic data obtained from one or 
many studies in the economic analysis for a related study (Rosenberger, 
2001).   The major reason for using the benefits transfer method is when 
the study budget is not large (King, 2003).  When the study does not have 
enough money or time to conduct site specific analyses, the benefits 
transfer method can obtain an estimate of the value while being relatively 
inexpensive.    In the case of obtaining existence values for endangered 
species, this means using data obtained from a study of one species and 
applying it to a closely related species.  For example, as mentioned 
earlier, the FWS has attempted a benefits transfer with the pygmy owl.  By 
using a value obtained for the Mexican spotted owl, the FWS was able to 
obtain a reasonable estimate of the non-use value of the Pygmy Owl 
(Industrial Econ., 2002).   
While benefits transfer is an accepted economic practice, there 
are a number of conditions which accompany it.  In order to get a 
reliable estimate, a number of requirements need to be met 
(Rosenberger, 2001).  These include: the recipient of the transfer must be 
thoroughly defined so that the kind of measure, the kind of value, and the 
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degree of certainty regarding the transfer is well known, the study from 
which the values will be obtained should be based on sound economic 
methods, correct empirical techniques, and adequate data, and, finally, 
that the recipient and the “donor” should have strong correspondence 
(Rosenberger, 2001).  Basically, this correspondence requires that the 
species be similar enough to validate the transfer.  Therefore, using the 
CVM values and the benefits transfer method, it is possible to obtain a 
value for the non-use value for the endangered species.   
 Option value is the final value the needs measuring.  Freeman 
defines option value as “the maximum willingness to pay for this contract 
[that eliminates supply uncertainty] on the understanding that if the 
option is not purchased the individual would be excluded from 
purchasing the good if he later demanded it” (1984, 2).  Option value is 
what a person would pay to maintain an environmental good when there 
is uncertainty surrounding their demand.  The individual does not want to 
consume the good at present but is unsure of his demand in the future.  A 
possible method for quantifying this option value is the use of the CVM.  It 
is possible to ask the respondents what they would pay for this option. It is 
also possible to use the hedonic pricing method (Kroeger, personal 
comm.).  Because the option value can be considered a future use value, 
it should be possible to determine a value based on regression 
techniques, by controlling for other variables.  By obtaining enough data 
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points, it would be possible to obtain a demand curve and estimate the 
consumer surplus.  Therefore, by using acceptable economic methods 
and other methods like TCM, hedonic property method, and the CVM, it is 
possible to quantify many of the benefits of critical habitat.   
Secondary Benefits 
The previous benefits described have all been direct benefits that 
arose from the protection of the species itself or its habitat.  For instance, 
existence value of the species is directly related to the species; ecosystem 
function values are directly related to the habitat.  In addition to these 
direct benefits of the species or its habitat, there are a number of 
“secondary benefits” that exist from the designation of critical habitat.  
“Secondary benefits” can be thought of as positive effects of a regulation 
that were not the intended results of the regulation.  When designating 
critical habitat, the intended result is protection of the species and its 
habitat.  However, there are a number of positive effects of this 
regulation.  These “secondary benefits” also can be seen as correcting for 
a market failure.  In certain situations, when there are negative 
externalities resulting from private actors actions, it is possible for critical 
habitat to correct for them.  For example, when a private developer is 
conducting analyses to determine how land should be developed, they 
do not consider public positive benefits into their analyses.  If critical 
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habitat is present, it could force the private actor to include these public 
benefits and, thus, correct this market failure.   
A hypothetical example of a possible “secondary benefit” is when 
critical habitat impacts developmental patterns along the edge of 
metropolitan areas.  If one assumes that urban sprawl is an unwanted 
development pattern and if critical habitat is able to stop urban sprawl, or 
at least cause it to become “smart growth,” then a “secondary benefit” is 
present.  If critical habitat can prevent some of the assumed negatives of 
urban sprawl, such as increased traffic congestion, habitat fragmentation, 
and increased air pollution, then this positive benefit needs to be included 
in the analysis. 
 Another hypothetical “secondary benefit” of critical habitat is the 
avoided cost of community services.  Many of the economic analyses 
conducted by the FWS have included altered developmental patterns as 
a cost.  However, they have failed to include the avoided cost of public 
infrastructure.  Some proposed residential developments actually cost 
society money (Dekel, 1997).  Providing these developments with public 
infrastructure, such as roads, sewer, and power, costs the county more 
than the taxes that they receive.  Therefore, if critical habitat can prevent 
these types of developments and avoid these community services, then 
that should be included in the analysis.     
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Structure of Economic Analysis 
The final major question is: what does the economic analysis look 
like?  The economic analysis that the FWS have used has been CBA.  
Tietenberg defines CBA as “an analysis of the gains and losses of an 
action which attempts to quantify both the benefits and costs in order to 
compare them” (2003, 607).  The costs of critical habitat designation are 
weighed against the benefits of designation.  According to the FWS, “the 
best standard practice in economic analysis is applying an approach that 
measures costs, benefits, and other impacts arising from a regulatory 
action against a baseline scenario of the world without regulation” 
(Industrial Economics, 2002, Preface).  However, in NMCGA v. United 
States Fish and Wildlife Service, the Tenth Circuit Court vacated this type 
of analysis.  Therefore, the FWS developed a new CBA, with two baselines.  
However, this analysis not only wastes the FWS’ time, money, and effort, it 
is contrary to the intentions of Congress.  The ESA only calls for the impacts 
of critical habitat to be analyzed, not the economic impacts of listing (16 
U.S.C. §1533(b)(1)(A)).  Therefore, the proposed methodology will be a 
single baseline analysis.   
Shingleton argues that, in NMCGA v. United States Fish and Wildlife 
Service, the Tenth Circuit is wrong and should not have invalidated the 
“baseline” approach.  He argues that, because Congress envisioned 
critical habitat providing additional benefits above those of listing, then 
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only those impacts should be measured, according to the ESA.  He states, 
“if Congress intended that critical habitat provide additional protection 
for the species, apart from the protection provided from listing, and that 
only the additional protection a critical habitat designation provided was 
to be evaluated, then the Tenth Circuit court is incorrect” (2003, 126).  
Further, he states, 
 “the baseline method was held invalid because 
no meaningful economic analysis occurred.  This 
was not because of the baseline approach per 
se; rather, it was held invalid because FWS 
interprets the adverse modification standard as 
not providing additional protection from the 
jeopardy standard.  If FWS changed its 
definitions, or its interpretation of them, and 
recognized that critical habitat designations do 
proved a higher standard of protection for the 
species, then the Tenth Circuit panels only reason 
for invalidating the baseline approach would 
disappear” (2003, 126).   
 
Therefore, the single baseline analysis should be the economic approach 
used.  By adding the second baseline, the FWS is simply adding more work 
without any benefit.   
Additionally, it should be explicit that the results of the CBA will not 
determine whether the area is included in the critical habitat or not.  
Because there is uncertainty in the numbers and ranges provided, it would 
be short-sighted to use the CBA as the decision-making tool.  As Freeman 
states,  
“it [CBA] should be considered as a framework 
and a set of procedures to help organize 
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available information.  Viewed in this light, 
benefit-cost analysis does not dictate choices; 
nor does it replace the ultimate authority and 
responsibility of decision makers.  It is simply a tool 
for organizing and expressing certain kinds of 
information on the range of alternative courses 
of action” (11).    
 
The information obtained during the CBA, information that could 
not be incorporated into the CBA, and the final results of the CBA should 
all be given equal weight in the final decision.   This final decision will 
therefore be a comprehensive one in which many values and 
preferences, not just economic ones, are expressed.   
The final aspect of the economic analysis is that it needs to be 
made through a formal rulemaking process.  Because Congress left much 
of the interpretation of the ESA to the DOI, the DOI has interpreted some 
of the legislative mandates contrary to Congressional intent.  An example 
of this is “prudency.”  Whereas Congress intended “prudency” to be used 
very rarely, FWS has intentionally misinterpreted this and rarely designated 
critical habitat.  As Houck states, “Interior’s use of ‘prudency’ in the 
designation process is nothing short of remarkable” (Houck, 1993, 303).  
This misinterpretation has left the critical habitat process open to litigation.  
Conservation groups sue the FWS to either list a species or designate 
critical habitat while development groups sue to stop the listing or reduce 
the amount of critical habitat designated.  This is not a constructive system 
for the ESA.   Therefore, the methodology for conducting the economic 
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analyses must be made through a rulemaking process.  This will give both 
sides an opportunity to express their concerns to the FWS about how the 
economic analyses are conducted.  After each side expresses their 
concerns, a final methodology would be finalized.  While this final 
methodology could come under legal attack, eventually, a complete 
methodology would be approved.  This, in turn, will protect the individual 
economic analyses performed from litigation due to a flawed analysis 





This section will attempt to outline a methodology that the FWS 
could us when performing the economic analysis.  It will rely on the 
assumptions and conclusions made in the previous section. 
0. The first step to establish this methodology is for the FWS to develop 
a comprehensive list of impacts that can be applied to each and every 
critical habitat designation.  It is important to note that they will only have 
to do this once, with the possibility for updates and revisions.  This 
comprehensive list of impacts needs to be created before any specific 
critical habitat designations are done.  These impacts will be a complete 
inventory of the impacts, both the costs and the benefits, associated with 
critical habitat designation.  An example of this comprehensive list is 
demonstrated by Table 1.  An example of an impact is a change in 
economic rent.  This can either be a cost or a benefit or both.  Depending 
on the situation, designating critical habitat can either raise or lower 
private property values.  The most important aspect of this step is to make 
sure that it is comprehensive.  It is possible, and most likely, that many of 
the values will be insignificant and drop out of any particular analysis.  An 
example would be Avoided negative externalities of urban sprawl.  If the 
particular critical habitat is being designated in a rural area, this impact 
will be insignificant and would drop out of the analysis.  The FWS would 
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have a number of possible methods for developing this list.  First, they 
could survey economists familiar with the ESA.  Second, they could consult 
with interest groups who scrutinize the ESA, such as Defenders of Wildlife 
and the New Mexico Cattle Growers Association.  Finally, they could 
conduct studies of recent critical habitat designations to determine what 
the actual affects were.  By carrying out these steps, the FWS would 
almost guarantee themselves a comprehensive list.   
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Table 1* Categories of potential economic impacts of critical 
habitat designation for species X: Generic template 
Value category Potential change in value due to critical habitat designation  
 Benefits Costs 
Direct use values • Increased development 
opportunities for some sectors  
• Reduced possibility of (local) 
extinction of species x (recreation, 
tourism - avoided loss of consumer 
and producer surplus) 
• Reduced possibility of (local) 
extinction of other ESA species 
(avoided loss of consumer and 
producer surplus) 
• Higher economic rents 1  
• Higher land values (from 
preservation of high environmental 
quality) 1 
• Increased consumer surplus 
(increased utility of critical habitat 
compatible recreational activities 
in absence of critical habitat 
incompatible activities with 
negative externalities) 2 
• Increase in net social benefit from 
reducing baseline activities with 
negative net social benefits4 




some sectors 3 
• Lower consumer 
surplus (due to 
higher prices 
















things) 3, 1 
 
Non-use values Avoided loss of stewardship, 
existence, and intrinsic values 
associated with critical habitat  
 
Option value Avoided loss of non-market option 




Avoided loss of ecosystem function 
values of area designated as critical 
habitat 5
 
Avoided cost of 
non-smart growth 
Avoided negative externalities of 
urban sprawl 6   
 
Avoided cost of  
community 
services 
Avoided cost of public infrastructure 
associated with development projects 





*Sources: General value categories based on Barbier (2000) and Brown Jr. and 
Shogren (1998).  Developed by Timm Kroeger at Defenders of Wildlife.   
 
Notes: * Not all benefit/cost categories are applicable in every case of critical 
habitat designation.  
 
1To the extent that land is used for marketed output, land values capture 
economic rents, and vice versa.  
 
2E.g.: increased enjoyment of snowshoeing or cross-country skiing without 
presence of snow mobiles.  
 
3Insofar as future development opportunities are anticipated, the lost 
opportunities of development will be captured, at least partly, in reduced 
land/capital asset values.  
 
4Example: Logging/grazing on public lands below social cost. Examples given in 
Rachlinski (1997) and Houck (1995).  
 
5 Includes the ecological regulatory function of the species of concern 
(especially important for keystone species).   
 
6 E.g., health damages from increased air pollution due to increases in private 




1. The first step for each individual analysis is to establish the spatial 
and temporal boundaries.  It is important to make the spatial boundary 
decision based on only the best available scientific/ecological data for 
the needs of the species.  These boundaries cannot take economic 
factors into consideration.  This would echo the listing process for the 
species.  The Act states that you can “exclude” an area.  This implies that 
the maximum area needed for recovery, based solely on biological 
needs, should be designated and then, based on economic 
considerations, specific areas can be excluded.  After the boundaries 
have been drawn with this ecological data, then the economic analysis 
can exclude specific areas if the costs are found to be too high.  The 
temporal boundary should be ten years.  This is because it is difficult to 
predict economic behavior beyond this point (Kroeger, personal Comm.).    
2. The next step is to identify land ownership and land use/cover for 
the proposed critical habitat.  When available, GIS should be used.  A 
matrix is then developed based on this data.  See Table 2 for an example.  
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Non-timber 
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3. The third step is to develop the economic baseline.  In order to do 
this, it is necessary to determine the existing management of the 
proposed lands and activities.  Examples of this management would be 
National Forest Plans, Fire Management Plans, and local and state land 
use plans.  The known activities’ intensity is recorded and entered into the 
matrix.  For example, it could determined that there is low intensity grazing 
on 100 acres, high intensity timbering on 1,000 acres, and low intensity 
camping on 1,500 acres of FS land (see Table 2).   
4. In order to lessen the analysis load, one can combine similar cells in 
the matrix.  For instance, if there is low intensity grazing occurring on BLM, 
FS, and BoR land, then it is possible to combine them into one cell.  This 
becomes the Land Use Type, like federal low intensity grazing.  It is 
important that when cells are combined, they have to have similar 
management.  If similar uses on federal lands have different management 
plans, then they should not be combined.   
5. The fifth step is to determine what changes in management will 
need to be made in response to critical habitat designation.  For 
example, grazing must be eliminated, timber harvests reduced by half, 
and no change with respect to low intensity camping.  This is the most 
important step in the process.  This will determine the economic effects of 
critical habitat designation.  Therefore, it is imperative that experts familiar 
with the species/ecosystems/activities determine what changes will be 
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made.  The second important aspect of this step is to attempt to identify 
what economic impacts are due exclusively to critical habitat 
designation.  While it can be difficult to separate the effects of listing from 
those of critical habitat designation, it is necessary to separate them so 
the economic analysis will not biased.    
6. The final step will be to determine the cost and benefits of each 
change in management based upon the comprehensive list of impacts.  
For example, if grazing is eliminated, it will have a number of different 
impacts.  It might reduce economic rents because the landowner is not 
compensated for the eliminated grazing.  It also might increase rents due 
to an increase in camping.  Most campers do not enjoy camping with 
cattle, so eliminating grazing is likely to increase camping.  When possible, 
these values should be quantified, per acre.  In the previous example, it is 
possible to determine the loss, and gain, in rents due to the elimination of 
grazing.  However, it will be necessary to critique the methods fully.  For 
example, while it is possible to use contingent valuation or benefits transfer 
to get a value for existence value for species, the limitations and 
uncertainties should be recognized and explicit.  When it is not possible to 
quantify the impacts, these values should be explained fully.  Just 
because these values cannot be quantified, this does not mean that they 
are not important.  An example of these unquantifiable impacts could be 
the loss/gain in ecosystem services.  It is possible that many of the impacts 
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will go unquantified due to the limited budgets of the Service and the 
large number of listing/critical habitat proposals outstanding.  However, as 
mentioned earlier, these unquantified impacts needs to be included in 






The Endangered Species Act is a vital component of the United 
States set of environmental laws.  It is the most comprehensive law in 
existence for the preservation of species, designed to not only protect the 
species itself but also the habitat upon which it depends.  The ESA forces 
the FWS and the NMFS to list endangered species, designate critical 
habitat, and implement recovery plans.  After the species has become 
listed, the ESA protects these species from “harm” by the use of federal 
consultations, project modifications, and prohibitions on “take.”  The ESA 
not only protects the species but it plans for the recovery and eventually 
delisting of the species.   Recovery plans are intended to facilitate 
improvement of the species.  They are plans that should set certain target 
goals for the federal agencies.  While there is controversy surrounding 
these plans, they can be vital for the recovery of the species. 
 Critical habitat is another important aspect of the ESA.    It protects 
the habitat upon which the species depends.  There has been much 
controversy on the historic implementation.  Traditionally, the FWS has 
declined to designate critical habitat because they feel that critical 
habitat provides no real conservation benefit above simply listing the 
species.  In order to justify not designating critical habitat, the FWS 
claimed that it would not be “prudent.”  Fortunately, recent lawsuits have 
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found that rationale to be unlawful (NRDC, 1997).  Now, the FWS must 
designate critical habitat according to the timetable that is given them.   
Unfortunately, a new controversy has recently appeared.  When 
designating critical habitat, the FWS must consider economic factors.  
Therefore, they conduct an economic analysis whenever they propose to 
designate critical habitat.  Originally, because the FWS saw no additional 
benefit of critical habitat, they also argued that there were no economic 
affects above those of listing.  This strategy has recently been held to be in 
violation of the ESA by the Tenth Circuit in NMCGA.   Now, the FWS is 
conducting economic analyses that attempt to examine the costs and 
benefits of critical habitat designation.  Unfortunately, what is actually 
happening is that the costs of critical habitat designation, generally 
consultation costs and project modifications, are being quantified while 
the benefits of critical habitat, like avoided loss of ecosystem services, 
avoided loss of existence values, and potentially higher land values, are 
not being quantified.  This results in a skewed CBA (Sinden, forthcoming).  
Because only the numbers from the CBA, which are the quantified costs, 
are published in the Federal Register, this can bias public opinion.  The 
unquantified benefits are not published and therefore not seen by the 
general public.  Therefore, what is needed is a methodology that can 
quantify the costs and benefits of critical habitat.  While it will be difficult, if 
not impossible, to quantify all of the benefits of critical habitat 
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designation, an attempt should be made to quantify as many as possible.  
For example, it is possible to estimate the existence value of species 
through the use of CVM.  It is also possible to estimate the change in land 
values (which may be positive or negative).  Therefore, these should be 
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